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ABSTRACT 
 
Property rights are a basic tenant of a free market economy, and when these rights are in 
jeopardy from crime and corruption, a free market system falters.  The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank have developed a methodology to 
study transition economies.  The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS II 2002) has gathered on a variety of topics from 23 transition economies.  This paper 
uses the BEEPS data to examine the perceptions of Corruption and State Capture in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he breakup of the former Soviet Union created 16 independent countries.  Those countries and the 
Eastern European countries that were under Soviet influence have in various stages moved away 
from a command economy and toward market economies.  One of the economic activities that 
impeded the movement toward capitalism has been the encroaching “grey” economy which has long cast an 
expanding shadow on the transitioning economies. Other “off the books” economic activities were widespread in the 
former Soviet Republics. In the transition years uncertainty in some countries has created an opportunity for the gray 
economy to expand.   
 
Corruption, which was also widespread during the Soviet era, took several forms, but manifest itself 
differently in what were then the Soviet client states. For example, in some states the government captured industries 
with severe regulations and individuals in the government were able to extract economic rent from the industry. In 
other states industries captured government (Parliaments for example) and were able with “gifts” to obtain favorable 
laws and regulations. State capture works because the industry is important to the state (or powerful individuals) or 
vise versa. Other examples include “gifts” to individual government employees to ignore laws and regulations. 
These gifts are called “grease the wheels of commerce” payments. This study examines the differences in the 
evolving economies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan utilizing World Bank data from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the World Bank data about corruption and the “grey” economy in 
the former Soviet states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan).  The study results 
can be used by non-governmental organizations (NGO), government, and regulatory officials as a basis for making 
policy decision.   
 
The World Bank in 1996 changed directions in its thinking about corruption.  Prior to 1996 the World Bank 
tolerated corruption because they believed that corruption was the “grease that made the wheels of commerce” turn.  
James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, in a speech in 1996 declared that the World Bank policy in the 
future would be to assume that corruption was “sand in the wheels of commerce” and impeded economic growth.  
Accordingly, the World Bank asserted that they would no longer tolerate corruption.  The United States in 1974 
passed the Foreign Corruption Practice Act which subscribed to similar views. After 1996 individual EU countries 
passed similar legislation to the U.S.’s Foreign Corruption Practice Act.   
T 
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OVER VIEW OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES  
 
The four Central Asian countries share many common features:  they are former parts of the Soviet Union 
and they are all landlocked.  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan share the Aral Sea whose water levels are dropping because 
of increased irrigation.  Chemical residue has dried and become an air-borne health hazard to area populations.  
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have high mountains and surface transportation is problematic. Kyrgyzstan produces and 
exports hydro power.  All of the four countries either produce cannabis and opium poppy or are part of the illegal 
Afghan trade route to Russia or Western Europe. 
 
 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Size 4 times size Texas Similar to South 
Dakota 
Smaller than 
Wisconsin 
Similar to California 
Population  1 15 million 5 million 7 million 27 million 
Median Age 28.8 years 23.6 years 20 years 22.7 years 
Infant Mortality per 
1,000 births 2 
28.3 34.5 106 70 
GDP real growth rate 2 8.5% 2% 7% 6.8% 
GDP per capita ppp  2 $9,100 $2,000 $1,300 $2,000 
Population Below 
Poverty Line   3 
19% 40% 64% 28% 
Inflation Rate  2 8.6% 6.4% 7.5% 7.6% 
Unemployment Rate 7.4%  3 18%  3 12%  3 .8% plus another 20% 
underemployed 2 
Source:  CIA World Factbook, February, 2007 
1   July 2006 estimate 
2   2006 estimate 
3   2004 estimate 
 
 
THE BEEPS DATA BASE 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (WB) have 
developed a methodology for studying the performance of transition economies such as the new EU entrants.  The 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS II 2002) was developed to capture a wide 
variety of data from firms in countries undergoing political and economic transition.  Data was collected on 
numerous aspects of business performance including sources of financing, corruption and business relationships 
with government. The study explored data from the major category Corruption and State Capture. Subcategories 
chosen from the data set were Public Procurement Kickbacks, State Capture, Tax Compliance, and Unoffical 
Payments.  For a more detailed explanation of the BEEPS data base please visit the World Bank Institute at 
www.wbi.org.  
 
CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE—PUBLIC PROCUREMENT KICKBACKS 
 
Examining the BEEPS category on “Corruption and State Capture” the subcategory on “Public 
Procurement Kickbacks” revealed some differences among the countries.  Managers responded to the query:  How 
much of the original contract value would be typically paid in additional or unofficial payments/gifts to secure the 
contract?  Managers in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan indicated that a typical unofficial payment would be 
of a lesser percentage of the contract price than did managers in Kyrgyzstan.  (Mention % groups?)  Table ONE here 
 
Table 1 – Public Procurement Kickbacks 
 
Question  Sig. 
How much of original contract would be 
additional payments or gifts to secure contracts 
Uzbekistan (3.0)A and Kazakhstan (3.1) and Tajikistan (3.1) 
< Kyrgyzstan (3.7) 
.010 
A Number in parentheses represent percent of original contract represented by additional payment 
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CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE—STATE CAPTURE 
 
In the subcategory exploring private payments to public officials to gain favor, managers were asked about 
private payments (private payment/gifts or other benefits) to Parliamentarians to affect their votes. Managers in 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan indicated that payments to parliamentarians had a lesser impact on voting 
than did managers in Kyrgyzstan.  Likewise, in exploring the impact of these payments to government officials to 
affect the content of government decrees, managers indicated such payments in Kazakhstan had less impact than did 
managers in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. 
 
A similar question was asked about the impact of private payments to judges to affect decisions of criminal 
court cases.  Managers in Kazakhstan indicated private payments to judges were less likely to impact decisions in 
criminal cases than were private payments in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan.  Private payments to judges to affect criminal 
court cases had the most impact in Tajikistan. 
 
Firms were asked about the impact of private payments to judges to affect the decisions in commercial 
cases.  Managers indicated that in Kazakhstan private payments to judges were much less likely to influence 
commercial cases than were similar private payments made to judges in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  Firms 
indicated private payments to judges in Tajikistan were much more likely to impact commercial cases than the other 
three countries. 
 
Firms were asked about private payments to central bank officials to affect bank policies and decision(s).  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan managers indicated private payments to central bank officials were much less likely to 
impact bank policies and decisions than did managers in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
 
Firms were asked about the impact of illegal contributions to political parties and/or election campaigns to 
affect the decisions of elected officials.  Illegal payments of this type in Kazakhstan were deemed to have much less 
impact than were payments to political parties in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  
 
 
Table 2 – State Capture 
 
Question  Sig. 
Private payments or gifts to parliament to affect 
their votes contracts 
Kazakhstan (4.9)B and Tajikistan (6.3) and Uzbekistan (8.4) < 
Kyrgyzstan (12.8) 
.001 
Private payments or gifts to government to affect 
the content of government decrees 
Kazakhstan (4.2) < Kyrgyzstan (11.8) and Uzbekistan (12.1) and 
Tajikistan (12.4) 
.000 
Private payments or gifts to judges to affect the 
decisions of criminal court cases 
Kazakhstan (4.4) < Kyrgyzstan (11.4) and Uzbekistan (11.7) < 
Tajikistan (22.3) 
.000 
Private payments or gifts to judges to affect the 
decisions in commercial cases 
Kazakhstan (6.2) < Uzbekistan (13.0) and Kyrgyzstan (16.7) < 
Tajikistan (26.3) 
.000 
Private payments or gifts to central bank officials 
to affect central bank policies and decisions 
Kazakhstan (3.7) and Kyrgyzstan (7.5) < Uzbekistan (14.2) and 
Tajikistan (18.5) 
.000 
Private payments or gifts to political parties to 
affect the decisions of elected officials 
Kazakhstan (2.6) < Kyrgyzstan (6.5) and Uzbekistan (7.7) .007 
B The scale for numbers in the parentheses is: 0 = No impact, 25 = Minor impact, 50 = Moderate impact 
 
 
CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE—TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
The BEEPS survey also asked managers: “Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations what per cent of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your 
area of business reports for tax purposes?”  Firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan report a lower percent of annual 
sales for tax purposes than do firms in Kazakhstan.  Firms in Uzbekistan report the greatest percentage of annual 
sales for tax purposes.   
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Table 3 – Tax Compliance 
 
Question  Sig. 
Percent of total annual sales firms in your business 
report for tax purposes 
Tajikistan (68.4)C and Kyrgyzstan (69.3) < Kazakhstan (78.0)  
< Uzbekistan (84.4) 
.000 
C Number in parentheses represent percent of total sales reported for tax purposes 
 
 
CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE—UNOFFICIAL PAYMENTS 
 
Firms were asked to comment about the frequency of unofficial (irregular/additional payments/gifts) to get 
things done e.g. customs, licenses, regulations, services, etc.  Firms in Uzbekistan make unoffical payments less 
frequently than do firms in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.  Firms in Kyrgyzstan make these types of payments more 
frequently than do firms in the other three countries. 
 
Firms were queried about whether it was common for firms in their industry to know in advance about how 
much the unoffical payment would be.  Uzbek firms were much less likely to know in advance the size of the 
unoffical payment than were firms in Kazakhstan and it Tajikistan.  Firms in Kyrgyzstan were most likely to know 
the amount of expected payment. 
 
Firms were asked about the percent of total annual sales firms like theirs typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials.  Firms in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan typically pay a smaller 
percentage of annual sales to public officials than do firms in Kyrgyzstan. While the difference is significant, the 
average percentage paid for all four countries was less than 4.5%. 
 
 
Table 4 – Unofficial Payments 
 
Question  Sig. 
Common for firms to have to make some irregular 
payment or gifts with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services, etc. 
Uzbekistan (29.1)D < Kazakhstan (37.6) and Tajikistan (40.1) < 
Kyrgyzstan (47.9) 
.000 
Common for firms to know in advance about how 
the size of this irregular payment or gift 
Uzbekistan (28.2)E < Kazakhstan (36.9) and Tajikistan (39.4) < 
Kyrgyzstan (45.5) 
.000 
Percent of total annual sales firms in your business 
pay in unofficial payments or gifts to public 
officials 
Uzbekistan (3.0)F and Tajikistan (3.1) and Kazakhstan (3.3) < 
Kyrgyzstan (4.4) 
 
D and E the scale for numbers in parentheses is: 0 = Never, 20 = Seldom, 40 = Sometimes, 60 = Frequently 
F Number in parentheses represent the percent of total annual sales paid to or as gifts to public officials 
 
 
CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE--FREQUENCY OF UNOFFICIAL PAYMENTS 
 
Respondents were asked about how often firms like theirs would make unofficial payments to get 
connected to and maintain public services (electricity and telephone).  Firms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan made 
such payments less often than did firms in Kyrgyzstan. Firms in Tajikistan made these payments more often that did 
firms in the other three countries.  
 
Firms were asked about how often they would make unofficial payments to officials to obtain business 
licenses and permits.  Firms in Uzbekistan made these payments less frequently than did firms in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.  A similar question was asked about the frequency of unofficial payments to obtain government 
contracts.  Firms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan paid these unofficial payments less frequently than did firms in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
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Firms were asked about how often firms like theirs would make unofficial payments to deal with 
occupational health and safety inspections.  Firms in Uzbekistan made these unofficial payments less frequently than 
did firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  Queried about unofficial payments to deal with firm and building 
inspections firms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan indicated they made these types of payments less frequently than 
did respondents in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Firms were asked about how often firms like theirs would make unofficial payments to deal with 
environmental inspections.  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan made these unofficial payments less frequently than did 
firms in Kyrgyzstan.  Firms in Tajikistan more frequently made these types of payments than did firms in the other 
three countries.  
 
Firms were asked about how often firms like theirs would make unofficial payments to deal with taxes and 
tax collection.  Firms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan made these types of unofficial payments less frequently than 
did firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. When asked about the frequency of unofficial payments to deal with 
customs/imports, Uzbek and Kazak firms used this route less frequently than did firms in Kyrgyzstan.  Firms in 
Tajikistan used this type of unofficial payment more frequently than did firms in the other three countries. 
 
Firms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan used unofficial payments to deal with courts and to impact the content 
of new legislation rules less frequently that did firms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
 
 
Table 5 – Frequency of Unofficial Payments 
 
Question  Sig. 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to get 
connected to and maintain public services 
(electricity and telephone) 
Uzbekistan (17.4)G and Kazakhstan (20.8) < Kyrgyzstan (27.0) 
< Tajikistan (37.9) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to 
obtain business licenses and permits 
Uzbekistan (12.6) < Kyrgyzstan (19.6) and Tajikistan (23.8) .001 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to 
obtain government contracts 
Uzbekistan (7.8) and Kazakhstan (8.4) < Tajikistan (12.2) and 
Kyrgyzstan (11.4) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with occupational health and safety inspections 
Uzbekistan (13.6) < Tajikistan (21.9) and Kyrgyzstan (24.3) .000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with fire and building inspections 
Uzbekistan (8.9) and Kazakhstan (10.7) < Tajikistan (19.4) and 
Kyrgyzstan (21.6) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with environmental inspections 
Uzbekistan (7.9) and Kazakhstan (9.5) < Kyrgyzstan (15.4) < 
Tajikistan (26.5) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with taxes and tax collections 
Uzbekistan (22.0) and Kazakhstan (24.6) < Kyrgyzstan (45.0) < 
Tajikistan (49.4) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with customs/imports 
Uzbekistan (12.4) and Kazakhstan (15.2) < Kyrgyzstan (22.8) < 
Tajikistan (30.1) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with courts 
Uzbekistan (8.3) and Kazakhstan (8.8) < Kyrgyzstan (19.4) and 
Tajikistan (24.1) 
.000 
How often do firms make payments or gifts to deal 
with the content of new legislation rules, decrees, 
etc. 
Uzbekistan (4.3) and Kazakhstan (4.9) < Kyrgyzstan (11.8) and 
Tajikistan (12.1) 
.000 
G the scale for numbers in parentheses is: 0 = Never, 20 = Seldom, 40 = Sometimes, 60 = Frequently 
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PERCEPTIONS OF THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
Firms were asked to assess how problematic various factors were for the operation and growth of their 
business.   Firms in Kazakhstan had less problems accessing financing than did firms in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Tajikistan.  Firms in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan had fewer problems with the cost of financing 
than did firms in Tajikistan. 
 
Firms in Kazakhstan had fewer problems with telecommunications than did firms in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.  Firms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had fewer problems with electricity than did firms in Kyrgyzstan.  
Firms in Tajikistan had greater difficulties with electricity than did firms in the other three countries.  
 
Firms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had fewer transportation impediments than did firms in 
Tajikistan.  Firms in Kazakhstan saw access to land an impediment to operations and growth less of a problem than 
did firms in Tajikistan. 
 
Firms in Kazakhstan indicated that tax rates and tax administration were less problematic to the operation 
and growth of business than did firms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Firms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Uzbekistan found customs and trade regulation less problematic than did firms in Tajikistan.  Firms in Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan found business licensing and permits less of a problem than did firms in Tajikistan. 
 
Labor regulations posed less of a problem for firms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan than did labor 
regulations in Tajikistan.  Firms in Uzbekistan indicated that the level of skills and education of available workers 
was less of a problem than did firms in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Firms in Kazakhstan felt that economic policy uncertainty was less of a problem for the operation and 
growth of their business than did firms in Tajikistan.  Firms in Kazakhstan were felt macroeconomic instability 
(inflation, exchange rates) were less problematic for the operation and growth of their businesses than did firms in 
the other three countries. 
 
Firms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan felt the functioning of the judiciary was less problematic to the 
operation and growth of their businesses than did firms in Kyrgyzstan.  Firms in Uzbekistan found corruption less 
problematic than did firms in Kazakhstan. Firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan found corruption more problematic 
than did firms in the other two countries. 
 
Street crime, theft, or disorder appeared to be less of a problem for firms in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than 
for firms in Kazakhstan.  Firms in Kyrgyzstan found street crime, theft, or disorder more problematic than did firms 
in the other countries.  Organized crime or Mafia intrusion was deemed less problematic by firms in Uzbekistan than 
by firms in Kazakhstan.  Firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan felt organized crime or the Mafia influence more 
problematic. 
 
Anticompetitive practices were less problematic for firms in Uzbekistan than for firms in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  Contract violations by customers or suppliers were less problematic for firms in 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan than they were for firms in Tajikistan.  Title or leasing of land were 
deemed less problematic for firms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan than for firms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
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Table 6 – Perceptions of the Business Environment 
 
Question  Sig. 
How problematic is access to financing for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (24.9)H < Kyrgyzstan (30.1) < Tajikistan (40.5) .000 
How problematic is the cost of financing for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (29.0) and Uzbekistan (34.9) and Kyrgyzstan (35.0) 
< Tajikistan (42.2) 
.000 
How problematic is telecommunications for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (7.7) < Kyrgyzstan (13.1) < Tajikistan (19.2) .000 
How problematic is electricity for the operation 
and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (8.1) and Uzbekistan (11.6) < Kyrgyzstan (16.2) < 
Tajikistan (29.1) 
.000 
How problematic is transportation for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (9.1) and Kyrgyzstan (11.2) and Uzbekistan (11.2) 
< Tajikistan (19.6) 
.000 
How problematic is access to land for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (10.1) < Tajikistan (17.2) .009 
How problematic is tax rates for the operation 
and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (32.4) < Kyrgyzstan (38.7) < Tajikistan (44.3) .000 
How problematic is tax administration for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (33.9) < Kyrgyzstan (40.2) < Tajikistan (42.7) .007 
How problematic is customs and trade 
regulations for the operation and growth of your 
business 
Kazakhstan (20.7) and Kyrgyzstan (22.3) and Uzbekistan (24.4) 
< Tajikistan (31.4) 
.002 
How problematic is business licensing and 
permits for the operation and growth of your 
business 
Uzbekistan (18.7) and Kazakhstan (20.3) < Kyrgyzstan (22.4) 
and Tajikistan (32.3) 
.000 
How problematic is labor regulations for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Uzbekistan (7.2) and Kazakhstan (7.6) < Tajikistan (11.7) .028 
How problematic is skills and education of 
available workers for the operation and growth of 
your business 
Uzbekistan (14.6) < Kyrgyzstan (21.1) .009 
How problematic is economic policy uncertainty 
for the operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (31.5) < Uzbekistan (37.3) < Tajikistan (43.9) .000 
How problematic is macroeconomic instability 
(inflation, exchange rates) for the operation and 
growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (30.8) < Kyrgyzstan (42.3) and Uzbekistan (45.3) 
and Tajikistan (45.7) 
.000 
How problematic is functioning of the judiciary 
for the operation and growth of your business 
Uzbekistan (16.7) and Kazakhstan (16.7) < Kyrgyzstan (24.4) .002 
How problematic is corruption for the operation 
and growth of your business 
Uzbekistan (17.7) < Kazakhstan (24.8) < Tajikistan (31.7) and 
Kyrgyzstan (33.7) 
.000 
How problematic is street crime or theft or 
disorder for the operation and growth of your 
business 
Uzbekistan (14.5) and Tajikistan (14.8) < Kazakhstan (20.2) < 
Kyrgyzstan (29.1) 
.000 
How problematic is organized crime or Mafia for 
the operation and growth of your business 
Uzbekistan (11.2) < Kazakhstan (16.4) < Tajikistan (22.1) and 
Kyrgyzstan (25.2) 
.000 
How problematic is anticompetitive practices of 
other producers for the operation and growth of 
your business 
Uzbekistan (14.8) < Kazakhstan (21.1) and Kyrgyzstan (25.3) 
and Tajikistan (26.7) 
.000 
How problematic is contract violations of or by 
customers and suppliers for the operation and 
growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (22.4) and Uzbekistan (22.6) and Kyrgyzstan (27.8) 
< Tajikistan (33.0) 
.000 
How problematic is title or leasing of land for the 
operation and growth of your business 
Kazakhstan (10.5) and Uzbekistan (10.8) < Tajikistan (17.0) and 
Kyrgyzstan (20.5) 
.000 
H the scale for numbers in parentheses is: 0 = No obstacle, 20 = Minor obstacle, 50 = Moderate obstacle 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Several patterns emerge from the data.  In general it appears that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are perceived 
to be less corrupt than Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  In some cases Kazakhstan is perceived to be the least corrupt and 
in others Uzbekistan is thought to be less corrupt. Perceptions of Tajikistan as more corrupt are prevalent but in 
some situations Kyrgyzstan is considered more corrupt. 
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